Directions
Answer questions below in 1 page. On second page reply to each student in 1 paragraph for each person you can agree or disagree for each reply. I will attach readings and student replies below.
Question
We divided the readings this week. What are the key points you want the class to note from your readings on the former USSR region? What about the case of South Africa? Why do you think there was so much progress globally on constraining WMD programs? (Note: it is not JUST that the Cold War ended. That had little impact on places like Brazil, Argentina or South Africa).
References and readings
William C. Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine,” Occasional Paper, Henry L. Stimson Center. (PDF)
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Occasional%20Paper%20No.%2022%20April%201995.pdf
Frank V. Pabian, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995 (PDF).
Waldo Stumpf, “The Birth and Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,”
http://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm
International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Presentation of Global Fissile Materials Report 2015.” (PDF)
http://fissilematerials.org/library/ipfm15.pdf
Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 2014 (PDF)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf
Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibeck,” Non-proliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1999 (PDF)
Dr. Stephen Burgess, Dr. Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, USAF Counter proliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2001. (PDF)
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/southafrica.pdf
Student replies
Nicholas Bakker
In 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to be an effective and continuing governing entity, the former Soviet bloc states under its direct control successfully declared their independence. Initially, this worried many powers in the western hemisphere.
Due to the Soviet Nuclear Doctrine, the Soviet’s nuclear ordinance (i.e. nuclear missile silos, storage facilities, mobile launch platforms, etc.) was spread out over the whole of Russia and its surrounding territories. With the birth of so many new nations, of whom were formerly communist, and under the leadership of new governments which, at the time, were unknowns, and in control of a sizable portion of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, it caused concern that the nuclear materials/ weapons/ delivery systems could fall into 3rd party hands (i.g. Iran, or insurgent groups like Al-Qaeda), or could be used by the governments in control of the weapons.
Only three years later though, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had not only become signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but also begun transferring their nuclear ordinance and capability to Russia to be decommissioned. (Potter, 1995) Similarly, “the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union have [also] been willing partners [of the US] in dismantling the Soviet biological weapons legacy” (i.e. they have sought help in securing and/ or dismantling their biological weapons facilities and capabilities since the late 1990s. (Woolf et al., 2014)
I believe there has been a lot of attempted progress on the topic of nuclear non-proliferation since the end of the Cold War, however, one would also note that the most progress/ success was accomplished when particular agreements and treaties sought three things:
1) conformed to the constraints and parameters set by the structure of the international system,
2) when the agreements benefitted both parties, and
3) when there were effective methods of checking that the agreements were being honored. Concerning the success of WMD disarmament in the former Soviet bloc countries, it follows the same conditions.
First, the agreements between the US and the former Soviet bloc states, and between Russia and its former satellites, were executed using realistic conditions and measures that could be accomplished (i.e. the goals and expectations set forth were realistic, and were set using realistic timetables). Second, WMD drawdowns benefitted Russia, the US, and the new states in Central Asia (i.g. Loosely guarded and maintained nuclear/ biological weapons and facilities posed a significant security risk for all parties and, in addition, was an unwanted source of financial drain for the new states).
Lastly, under the conditions for both financial aid and help with WMD withdrawal from the US and Russia, they were allowed to inspect and ensure that biological/ nuclear facilities and weapons in the former Soviet countries were properly maintained. In the case of Russia, this was to ensure that the nuclear material could be safely transported to Russian decommissioning facilities to be destroyed. When those three conditions have been accomplished, significant progress towards disarming the world of nuclear weapons can be made, like the NPT.
References:
William C. Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine,” Occasional Paper, Henry L. Stimson Center. (PDF)
Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues
Meghan Swall (She/Her)
(Potter, IPFM, Nikitin & Woolf, BW in USSR)
The three former Soviet Union satellite countries, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, have had an interesting relationship and development of nuclear weapons and materials. As former Soviet satellite republics, the Soviet Union used these countries as their nuclear laboratories. These countries had nuclear facilities built in their territories, were nuclear testing sites, and thus inherited several nuclear capabilities. These countries inherited these nuclear capabilities when Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union and the countries respectively declared their independence. One subsequent study found “that nuclear inheritance might ‘pose one of the gravest dangers of the next decade’”.
However, like their unique nuclear inheritance, these countries were also uniquely committed to not utilizing their inheritance. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were founding members of the Commonwealth of Independence States. The idea was that these countries “will preserve and support common military and strategic space under a common command, including common control over nuclear armaments, which will be regulated by special agreement.” Moreover, and more importantly these countries were committed to signing the Joint Measures on Nuclear Arms. This confirmed their adherence to the nonproliferation of nuclear armaments. Additionally, the United States through the Department of Defense and Department of Energy were committed to helping the former Soviet Union draw-down their nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that through multilateral and international cooperation, there was so much progress globally on constraining WMD programs.
